The secrecy capacity achieving problem of the wiretap channel against an active eavesdropper with unlimited computational power over is an important foresighted task for secure communication. For active wiretap channel, the effectiveness of cryptography embedded secure coding schemes are limited due to the passive problem of physical layer coding. Thus in this paper, a novel solution called active secure coding scheme is proposed which combines physical secure coding with machine learning to implement an active defense against the active eavesdropper.
On the contrary, for more practical category of WTC, the Active Wiretap Channel (A-WTC), physical layer secure coding schemes are however no longer effective. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , in A-WTC whole WTC is under the control of an active eavesdropper with various wiretapping measures, such as selectively reading (WTC-II [11] ), selectively writing (Adversarial WTC [12] ), channel status changing (Arbitrary Varying WTC [13] ), while in many cases, channels and wiretapping status are unknown to the legitimate users [14] . Since physical layer coding can only be constructed on a fixed status of channels and defense passively, it is hard for the passive secure coding scheme to cover the constantly changed active eavesdropping in A-WTC.
One commonly adapted modification method for A-WTC secure scheme construction is the combination of cryptography and physical layer secure coding [12] , [15] , [16] which is unfortunately unapplicable to the unlimited computational condition. Besides, even though cryptography can add adaptability to the secure scheme to some extents, the essentially passive problem of physical layer coding remains unsolved. Thus, when the range of active-eavesdropping behavior is expanded or the type of eavesdropping behavior is changed, the effectiveness of encrypted secure coding schemes will be vanished. In the aim of constructing an efficient secure coding scheme for A-WTC, the essentially passive problem must be solved. Thus, in this paper, we present a novel idea called active secure coding scheme. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , instead of passively defense with a fix secure coding, active secure coding scheme is designed to respond to the active changes of wiretap behavior and adjust the secure coding actively. The core issue of designing an active secure coding scheme is how to respond the active changes of A-WTC correctly.
In 2007, A middle ground detectable precondition was presented in [17] when constructing an A-WTC encrypted secure coding scheme, which is also precisely useful to our active secure coding issue.
Definition 1 (Detectable precondition [17] ) In A-WTC active modification of eavesdropper may induce some physical effects in the environment that can be detected by legitimate parties.
Based on the detectable precondition, the general idea of our active secure coding scheme is as follow:
i. Learn the active eavesdropper behavior pattern of eavesdropper from the observed information;
ii. Decode or predict the eavesdropper behavior state from the observed information according to the learned behavior pattern;
iii. Construct or modify the optimal physical layer coding scheme corresponding to the decoded eavesdropper behavior state.
Thus, in this paper, we construct an active secure coding scheme as a novel solution for the foresighted problem of confidential communication over A-WTC with unlimited computation power. Specifically, under the detectable precondition, we use models and algorithms of machine learning to construct the eavesdropper behavior pattern learning and state decoding, which is positively related to the unlimited computation power; we use polar code to construct the secure coding.
The outline of this paper is as follow. Section II presents the notations and construct a abstract model of detectable A-WTC. Section III presents the construction of the machine learning based universal active secure coding scheme for abstract detectable A-WTC. Section IV presents the construction of active secure polar coding scheme for general varying WTC. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. ABSTRACT MODEL OF DETECTABLE A-WTC

Notation:
We define the integer interval [[a, b] ] as the integer set between a and b . For With the EB state S and observed information O, the discrete memoryless abstract detectable A-WTC is construct as (X , Y, Z, S, O) with two legitimate users Alice and Bob and an active eavesdropper Eve, as illustrated in Fig. 3 .
• Eve: actively choose the EB state S ∈ S which contains the main channel condition as p X|Y and the wiretapping approaches. Obtains Z N from the channel according to S.
• Alice: encode M into X N and transmit to Bob over the EB state S. Receive the observed information O when EB state is changing.
• Bob: receive Y N from Alice over the EB state S and decodes it into estimatedM .
Definition 4
For abstract detectable A-WTC with EB state si, the secrecy capacity is characterized as
For the construction of abstract detectable A-WTC, the only restricted assumption is
which guarantees the implementation of the physical layer secure coding. For every state value si ∈ S, define a correspondent N length code as follow. • the encoding function:
• the decoding function with error bits "?"
The performance of a code ci is defined as
• error probability:
• information leakage to Eve:
Definition 6 For state si, rate R is achievable if sequence of code ci exists under any of the criterions listed below:
• reliability criterion:
• weak security criterion:
• strong security criterion:
Remark 1 Reliability and security criterions are measures for evaluating the performance of a code ci. Reliability can be achieved with a vanishing error probability of decoding the messages.
Weak security can be achieved with a vanishing information leakage rate. And strong security can be achieved with a vanishing information leakage.
III. UNIVERSAL ACTIVE SECURE CODING SCHEME
In this section, we construct an universal active secure coding scheme on the EB state based abstract detected A-WTC, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . ii. Construct a learning process of the EB pattern from the observed information O by using machine learning algorithms;
iii. Construct a decoding process of the EB state S from the observed information O with learned EB pattern by using machine learning algorithms;
iv. Design a modification method for secure coding based on the decoded EB state S.
A. Model Construction for EB Pattern and Observed Information
Make the following assumptions.
• Assume that the active EB pattern is a stochastic process that can be expressed by stochastic models;
• Assume that legitimate users know S and O;
• Assume that the correspondence between EB state value and observation value is not one to one, otherwise EB state can be directly identified from the observed information.
Based on the assumptions above, we build the EB pattern and observation by using Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [18] . As illustrated in Fig 5 , the basic HMM contains two parts, a hidden internal part which is a Markov process of hidden states, and an external observation part for observing the emission information with probability correlation to the current hidden state. The structure of HMM can nicely match our state based detectable A-WTC model.
Active model construction:
Consider an HMM (S, O, A, B, π) with parameter set λ = (A, B, π). The corresponding relations between the detectable A-WTC and HMM are as follow.
• Alphabet S = {s1, s2, s3, ...} of the EB state equals to the state set S of HMM, denote aij is the transparent probability from state si to sj, bi is the 1 × |O| emission probability matrix from state si to O.
• Alphabet O = {o1, o2, o3, ...} of the detected information equals to the observation set O of HMM, denote |O| = γ;
• Matrix A is a α × α state transparent probability matrix of the internal Markov process of
• Matrix B is a α × γ emission probability matrix of HMM from
• π is a 1 × α probability matrix for the initial state S 1 when t = 1, have
Generally, denote M the internal Markov process of HMM. For t = 1, define S 1 = M(π); for t > 1,
where (a) is for the first-order Markov model (1-HMM) case. Denote E the external emission process, then have
Remark 2 In the proposed model construction with 1-HMM, the EB pattern is described by a first-order Markov model which is a basic stochastic model. In case for more practical needs, high-order Markov model or other better stochastic models can be applied to enhance the model accuracy but will also increase the calculating complexity. As in 1-HMM, we simply use the emission probability to establish the correlation between EB state and detected information.
In more complex cases, connections between each observations can be modified.
Theorem 1 (Squared prediction error [23] , [24] ) Let V be the variable that we trying to predict, and Q be the covariates. Assume a relationship as
where is the error term that normally distributed with a mean of zero, e.g. ∼ N (0, σ ). Then for an estimate modelf (Q) of f (Q), the expected squared prediction error at point q is
and can be decomposed into bias and variance components as
in the form of
where the irreducible error is the noise term in the true relationship. In practical cases with imperfect model and finite data, there is a tradeoff between minimizing the bias and minimizing the variance. Considering a theoretically case with vanished noise, true model and infinite data for calibration, both the bias and variance terms can be reduced to 0.
B. EB Pattern Learning
To construct the active secure coding scheme, firstly we implement the learning procedure of the EB pattern from the observed information. Considering the HMM based model construction for detectable A-WTC, the issue of EB pattern learning can be turned into the learning of the HMM parameter set λ = (A, B, π) from the observation time sequence O t 1 which is the training data.
EB pattern learning: considering t-times transmissions, with parameter set λ for the stochastic model of EB pattern and observation, EB state S ∈ S and observation sequence O t 1 , O ∈ O, the EB pattern learning process L is to learn the optimal estimatedλ from training data O
Thus for the HMM (S, O, A, B, π), the learning process is
To learn the optimal estimated parameter set of HMM, we can apply the Baum-Welch algorithm [18] , as in Appendix A.
C. EB state Decoding
Based on the learned EB pattern and the observation correlation, specifically the optimal estimated parameter setλ, we can decoding the observation O t 1 to obtain the estimated EB state time sequenceŜ
EB state decoding: considering t-times transmissions, with parameter set λ for the stochastic model of EB pattern and observation, EB state S ∈ S and observation sequence O t 1 , O ∈ O, the EB state decoding process D is the process to decode the optimal estimatedŜ
Thus for the HMM (S, O, A, B, π), the decoding process iŝ
To decode the optimal estimated EB state sequence of HMM, we can apply the Viterbi algorithm [19] , as in Appendix B.
D. Modification Method for Secure Coding
Considering two different cases for the detectable A-WTC,
• Non-delay A-WTC: in this case, the actively changing of EB states is ahead of the encoding process. In this paper, we study the non-delay case, and leave the delay case for future researches.
Optional secure coding: For each EB state value si ∈ S, assume a corespondent physical layer secure coding ci as defined in Definition 5, and obtain the secure coding set C = {c1, c2, ..., cα} which satisfies both reliability (7) and strong security criterion (9) . Therefore for the abstract detectable A-WTC, after obtainingŜ t ∈ S from the observation O t 1 by EB pattern learning and states decoding, one can directly choose secure codeĈ t ∈ {c1, c2, ..., cα} that corresponds tô
In order to learn a relatively stable initial EB pattern for decoding the EB state and maintaining security at the beginning of the secure communication, we installing a pre-learning stage for initial training data collection. 
E. Performance Analyses
Definition 7 Denote symbol ∨ as match and symbol ∧ as unmatch. e.g. for S = {s1, s2, ..., sα}
Thus for i-th time secure transmission, i ∈ [ [1, t] ], when N → ∞, assume
• error probability
For each time of secure transmission, ifĈ i matches EB state S i , then transmission achieves security and reliability; ifĈ i does not match EB state S i , we assume that neither security nor reliability is achieved. Based on these setting, we analyze the average performance of t times independent secure communications.
into two sets t(∨) and t(∧), where t(∨) is the numbers of times thatĈ i matches S i , with set length t ∨ , and t(∧) is the numbers of times thatĈ i dose not match S i , with set length t ∧ . From (23), for (t + ω) → ∞, have t ∨ /t = 1 − 2 and t ∧ /t = 2 .
Proposition 1 (Secrecy rate, reliability and security) For the abstract detectable A-WTC, the proposed universal active secure coding scheme can achieve the average secrecy capacity of t time secure communication under the reliability and strong security criterions, when N → ∞ and (t + ω) → ∞.
Proof: DenoteR s the average secrecy rate for t times secure transmission with N → ∞,
whereC s is the average secrecy capacity of t times secure transmission, and the equal holds for (b) when (t + ω) → ∞ that 2 is vanished.
Denote P e the error probability for t times secure transmission, have
For N → ∞, assume |M i | of each time are the same, then have
Thus P e is vanished for (t + ω) → ∞.
Denote L the information leakage (strong security) for t times secure transmission, have
where (c) is because transmissions of each times are independent. Thus L is vanished for (t + ω) → ∞ and N → ∞.
IV. ACTIVE SECURE POLAR CODING SCHEME FOR GENERAL VARYING WTC
In this section, we perform our universal active secure coding to a specific A-WTC, the General Varying WTC (GV-WTC), and construct an explicit active secure polar coding scheme.
A. The General Varying WTC
Varying Wiretap Channel, with another name Compound Wiretap Channel in [14] , is an A-WTC that the actual channel realization is controlled and shifted by the eavesdropper and unknown to the legitimate users, as illustrated in Fig. 6 . In the model, the channel realization remains constant during the N length codeword transmission at each rounds, and legitimate parties knows the entire set of possible channel realizations. In this paper, we discuss the general case of Varying WTC in which both main channel and wiretap channel are asymmetric with no degraded relations. 
For HMM based EB pattern and observation, O ∈ O, S ∈ S, have
• EB pattern:
• observation:
For every EB states of GV-WTC, the secrecy capacity C s (si) is the same as Definition 1, the reliability and security criterions are the same as Definition 6.
Theorem 2 [14]
For the GV-WTC, under the strong security criterion, the universal secrecy capacity C us with S is bounded by
B. Active Secure Polar Coding Scheme
To construct the active secure coding scheme, first we need to build a correspondent secure polar coding for each EB state si ∈ S.
Definition 10 (Bhattaharyya parameter) Consider a pair of random variables (X, Y ) with joint distribution p X|Y , where X is a binary random variable and Y is a finite-alphabet random variable. To measure the amount of randomness in X given Y , the Bhattaharyya parameter is defined as
Polar subset division for si: 
• main channel polarization
• wiretap channel polarization
• subset divisions of index N
assume 
Now we introduce the structure of our active secure polar coding scheme for GV-WTC. Active secure polar coding scheme:
The secure coding structure of t time secure communications is illustrated in Fig. 7 , which is a modified and extended multi-block chaining structure. For non-delay GV-WTC (X , Y, Z, S, O, λ) and confidential message M ∈ M, assuming legitimate parties know the full set of S, O, then the active secure polar coding scheme is as follow.
i. Pre-learning stage: same as the secure structure for abstract A-WTC, we set a pre-learning stage with ω rounds random transmission before the t times secure communications, with observations as o ω .
ii. EB pattern learning: for i-th time secure communication, i ∈ [[1, t]], with observations as
iii. EB state decoding: for i-th time, withλ i , decoding the optimal estimated state sequenceŝ
iv. Subsets division: for i-th time, based on the optimal estimated EB stateŝ i , perform the polar subsets division of index N , and obtain
v. Encoding: for i-th time, make the following assignment to u N :
-uÎ i \Ê i : assigned with information bits of M i ;
-uF i : assigned with frozen bits;
-uR i : assigned with uniformly distributed random bits;
-uÊ i : assigned with uniformly distributed random bits;
-uD i : assigned with deterministic bits calculated by (53); -uB i : if i = 1, assigned with a pre-shared random bits; if i > 1, assigned with the first
Then encode u N into the optimally distributed channel input x N by polar encoding x N = u N G N , and transmit x N over the channel.
vi. Decoding: for i-th time, legitimate user Bob receives y N and decodes it into the estimated u N by using the succussive cancelation decoding [4] .
-for j ∈F i ,û j is directly decoded as the frozen bits;
-for j ∈B i , if i = 1,û j is directly decoded as the pre-shared bits, if i > 1,û j is directly decoded as the correspondent bit ofûÊ i−1 in time i − 1;
C. Performance Analyses 
For i ∈ t(∨), have
For i ∈ t(∧), have
Then define the following subsets for i ∈ t(∧) cases.
• ξ i = (Î i \Ê i ) ∩ I i , the set that remains secure and reliable for message bits;
• ξ i =Î i ∩ (I i ∪ F i ), the set that remains secure forÎ i ;
•ξ i =Î i ∩ (B i ∪ R i , the set that is mistaken as secure forÎ i ;
, the set that remains reliable;
, the set that remains reliable forÊ i ;
, the set that is mistaken as reliable;
, the set that is mistaken as reliable forÊ i .
Lemma 1 ( [20]
, [21] ) Considering the polarization of the asymmetric discrete memoryless
Thus, have
Proposition 2 (Achievable secrecy rate) Let R s (t) be the secrecy rate of t time secure transmission for our proposed active secure polar coding scheme, when (ω + t) → ∞, the upper bound R s (t) achieves is greater than the upper bound of C us under the reliability and strong security criterion for GV-WTC.
Proof:
where (d) is due to Lemma 1. With (ω + t) → ∞ and N → ∞, have t(∧) → ∅, thus R s (t)
is upper bounded byC s−t(∨) , which is the average secrecy capacity of matched cases that
Lemma 2 ( [4], [22] ) Considering an arbitrary subset A of index N for DMC W , in case of A used as the information set and A c used as frozen set for polar coding, by applying the successive cancellation decoding, for β ∈ (0, 1/2), δ N = 2 −N β , the block error probability is bounded by
especially when
Proposition 3 (Reliability) Let P e (t) be the error probability of t times secure communication based on the proposed active secure polar coding scheme. Then when (ω+t) → ∞, the reliability criterion in Definition 6 can be achieved for β ∈ (0, 1/2), δ N = 2 −N β .
where (e) is due to Lemma 2. When (ω + t) → ∞, have t(∧) → ∅, thus P e (t) ≤ 2tO(2 −N β ) which satisfies the reliability criterion.
Lemma 3 ( [6]) Considering the multi-block chaining structure and the polar subset division
Definition 12 For arbitrary subset A of index N , define q 1 < q 2 < ... < q |A| be the correspondent indices of the elements U A , and
Lemma 4 ( [9]) Considering the multi-block chaining structure and the polar subset division
Proposition 4 (Security) Let L(t) be the information leakage of t times secure communication based on the proposed active secure polar coding scheme. Then when (ω + t) → ∞, the strong security criterion in Definition 6 can be achieved for β
where (f ) is due to Lemma 3. For k ∈ t(∨), have
where (g) is because U q i are independent from each other, (h) is becauseÎ = I for matched case, (i) is due to Lemma 4. Thus
For k ∈ t(∧), have
where (j) is due to Definition 11, (k) is due to Lemma 4. Thus
, so the strong security criterion is achieved.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel solution for A-WTC secure communication, called active secure coding scheme, which combines the method of machine learning to the traditional physical layer secure coding scheme to provide an active defense against the active eavesdropper, especially under the unlimited computational power condition.
To build an universal active coding method, we construct an HMM based abstract detectable A-WTC with the notions of EB state and EB pattern. Based on this abstract model, we apply the machine learning algorithms to construct a EB pattern learning and EB stated decoding schemes, which can effectively estimate the optimal EB state from the legitimate parties' observations. Therefore physical layer secure coding can actively responding the eavesdropper according to the estimated EB state.
Then we perform the active coding method to the GV-WTC and construct an explicit active secure polar coding scheme. In the scheme, we extends the multi-block chaining structure to adapt the EB states shifting cases for achieve the strong security for t times secure communication.
As proofed, both the active secure coding scheme for abstract A-WTC and active secure polar coding scheme for GV-WTC can achieve the average secrecy capacity under the reliability and strong security criterions. Then the Baum-Welch algorithm [18] for EB pattern learning is as follow. 
iii. Update: denote υ i (k) = p(S k = si|o k 1 , λ) and φ ij (k) = p(S k = si, S k+1 = sj|o k 1 , λ). Then according to the Bayes theorem, have
Then the parameter set λ of the HMM can be updated by 
Then the Viterbi algorithm [19] for EB state decoding is as follow. 
vi. Path trace, for k = t − 1, t − 2, ..., 1
